Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack without random oracle. The security of the proposed scheme depends on a new complexity assumption called the k+1 square roots assumption. Moreover, the k+1 square roots assumption can be used to construct shorter signatures under the random oracle model.
Introduction
Digital signatures are important and fundamental cryptographic primitives, they not only provide basic signing functionality but also are building blocks in cryptographic protocol design.
Short digital signatures are always desirable. They are necessary in some situation where people need to enter the signature manually, such as using a PDA that is not equipped with a keyboard. Additionally, short digital signatures are essential to ensure the authenticity of messages in low-bandwidth communication channels. In general, short digital signatures are used to reduce the communication complexity of any transmission. As noted in [24] , when one needs to sign a postcard, it is desirable to minimize the total length of the original message and the appended signature. In the early days, research in this area has been mainly focusing on how to minimize the total length of the message and the appended signature [25, 1] and how to shorten the DSA signature scheme while preserving the same level of security [24] . From Hidden Field Equation (HFE) problem and Syndrome Decoding problem, a number of short signature schemes, such as Quartz [26, 14] , McEliece-based signature [15] , have been proposed.
Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [9] used a totally new approach to design short digital signatures. The resulting signature scheme, referred to as the BLS signature scheme, is based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption on elliptic curves with low embedding degree. In BLS signature scheme, with a signature length = 160 bits (which is approximately half the size of DSS signatures with the same security level), it provides a security level of approximately O (2 80 ) in the random oracle model. In [28, 5] , a more efficient approach to produce a signature of the same length as BLS scheme was proposed. Nonetheless, its security is based on a stronger assumption.
Provable security is the basic requirement for signature schemes. Currently, most of the practical secure signature schemes were proven in the random oracle model [3] . Security in the random oracle model does not imply security in the real world. The first provably secure signature scheme in the standard model was proposed by Goldwasser et al. [21] in 1984. However, in this scheme, a signature is produced by signing the message bit-by-bit and hence, it is regarded as impractical for some applications. Independently, Gennaro, Halevi and Rabin [20] and Cramer and Shoup [16] proposed secure signature schemes under the so-called Strong RSA assumption in the standard model and the efficiency of which is suitable for practical use. Later, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [11] and Fischlin [18] constructed two provably secure signature schemes under the strong RSA assumption in the standard model. In 2004, Boneh and Boyen [5] proposed a short signature scheme (BB04) from bilinear groups which is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack without using random oracles. The security of the scheme depends on a new complexity assumption, called the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. We note that Cheon [13] recently showed that SDH and related problems are slightly easier than discrete logarithm problem. However, his analysis is generic and does not violate the generic lower bounds on the hardness of SDH given in [5] . Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to design provably secure signature schemes using different hard problems.
In this paper, we construct a new, efficient and provably secure short signature scheme in the standard model from bilinear pairings. The signature size of the proposed scheme is the same as in the BB04 scheme. We note that our scheme is the second short signature scheme without random oracles. The security of our scheme depends on a new complexity assumption called the k+1 square roots assumption. In the random oracle model, we present a signature scheme that produces even shorter signature length. It produces a signature whose length is approximately 160 bits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains some preliminaries required throughout the paper. We briefly review the bilinear pairings and secure signature schemes, and propose the k+1 square roots problem and k+1 square roots assumption. In Section 3, we propose our new short signature scheme and its security analysis without random oracles. In Section 4 we show that by employing random oracles, the k+1 square roots assumption can be used to build even shorter signatures. In this section, we also provide a security proof under the random oracle model. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries

Bilinear Pairings
In recent years, the bilinear pairings have been found to be very useful in various applications in cryptography and have allowed us to construct new cryptographic primitives. We briefly review the bilinear pairings using the same notation as in [7, 9] :
Let G be (mutiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order q. Let g be a generator of G .
is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following properties:
Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1. In other words, if g is a generator of G, then e(g, g) generates G T . 3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G.
We say that G is a bilinear group if there exists a group G T , and a bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T as above. Such groups can be found on supersingular elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves over finite fields, and the bilinear parings can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairing.
The k + 1 Square Roots Assumption
In this subsection, we first introduce a new hard problem on which the new signature scheme in this paper is based.
Definition 2 (k + 1-SRP). The k + 1 Square Roots Problem in (G, G T ) is as follows: For an integer k, and x ∈ R Z q , g ∈ G, given
We say that the k + 1-SRP is (t, )-hard if for any t-time adversary A, we have
where is negligible.
Definition 3 (k + 1-SR Assumption). We say that the (k + 1, t, )-SR assumption holds in (G, G T ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the k+1-SRP in (G, G T ), i.e., k + 1-SRP is (t, )-hard in (G, G T ).
Remarks. k + 1 Square Roots Problem is not a well studied problem and we are uncertain of its difficulty. A simple observation is that when we obtain enough values of h i (about log q) such that for each h i , x+h i is a quadratic residue modulo q, then there exists a unique x that satisfies these equations. The explanation of this observation is as follows. Given h 1 , h 2 , ..., h k , for each h i , there are many elements in G such that the sum of each of these elements and h i is a quadratic residue. For convenience, we denote by S i (wrt. h i ) those elements such that for any element x ∈ S i , x + h i is a quadratic residue. The solution of k + 1 Square Roots Problem is in the intersection of {S i }, i = 1, · · · , k. Therefore, x is unique when k is large enough. However, when q is large, there exists no efficient algorithm to find {S i } for each h i . The fact that x is unique given the above sets also precludes lower bounds on the hardness of our assumption in the generic group model. We note that this property does not degrade the security of our schemes.
Secure Signature Schemes
A signature scheme consists of the following four algorithms: a parameter generation algorithm ParamGen, a key generation algorithm KeyGen, a signature generation algorithm Sign and a signature verification algorithm Ver.
There are two types of attacks against signature schemes, namely the nomessage attack and the known-message attack. In the first case, the attacker only knows the public key of the signer. In the second case, the attacker has access to a list of message-signature pairs. The strongest type of chosen-message attack is called the adaptively chosen-message attack, where the attacker has the knowledge of the public key of the signer, and he can ask the signer to sign any message that he wants. He can then adapt his queries according to the previous message-signature pairs. The strongest notion of security for signature schemes was defined by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [21, 22] as follows:
Definition 4 (Secure signatures [21, 22] ). A signature scheme S = < ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Ver > is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack if it is infeasible for a forger who only knows the public key to produce a valid message-signature pair after obtaining polynomially many signatures on messages of its choice from the signer.
Formally, for every probabilistic polynomial time forger algorithm F there exist no non-negligible probability such that
Goldwasser et al. also constructed a signature scheme that satisfies the above security notion. Their scheme has an advantage that it does not use hash functions for message formatting. It is the first secure signature scheme under the standard model.
Here, we use the definition of [4] that takes into account the presence of an ideal hash function (the cryptographic hash function is seen as an oracle that produces a random value for each new query), and gives a concrete security analysis of digital signatures.
Definition 5 (Exact security of signatures [4] ). A forger F is said to (t, q H , q S , )-break the signature scheme S = < ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Ver > via an adaptive chosen message attack if after at most q H queries to the hash oracle, q S signatures queries and t processing time, it outputs a valid forgery with probability at least .
A signature scheme S is (t, q H , q S , )-secure if there is no forger who (t, q H , q S , )-breaks the scheme.
New Short Signatures Without Random Oracles
Construction
We describe the new signature scheme as follows:
Let e : G × G → G T be the bilinear pairing where |G| = |G T | = q for some prime q. We assume that |q| ≥ 160. As for the message space, if the signature scheme is intended to be used directly for signing messages, then |m| = 160 is good enough, since given a suitable collision resistant hash function, one can first hash a message to 160 bits, and then sign the resulting value. Hence, the messages m to be signed can be regarded as an element in Z q .
In order to give an exact security proof with a good bound for the new signature scheme, we assume that q ≡ 3 mod 4 (so that −1 is a non-quadratic residue modulo q), and the message space is {1, ..., (q − 1)/2}. For any message m ∈ {1, ..., (q − 1)/2}, if m is not a quadratic residue modulo q, then q − m or −m will be a quadratic residue modulo q. The system parameters are (G, G T , e, q, g), where g ∈ G is a random generator.
Key Generation. Randomly select x, y ∈ R Z * q , and compute u = g x , v = g y . The public key is (u, v). The secret key is (x, y).
Signing: Given a secret key x, y ∈ R Z * q , and a message m ∈ {1, ..., (q − 1)/2}, pick a random r ∈ R Z * q ,
-If m is a quadratic residue modulo q, then compute is computed modulo q. When they are not quadratic residues modulo q, we try again with a different random r. The signature is (σ, r). Given a public key (G, G T , q, g, u, v) , a message m ∈ {1, ..., (q −
Verification:
The verification is correct due to the following equations:
Efficiency
To date, there exist three secure signature schemes without random oracles from the bilinear groups, namely BB04 scheme [5] , BMS03 scheme [10] and CL04 scheme [12] . BMS03 signature scheme is based on a signature authentication tree with a large branching factor. Compared to BMS03 and CL04 schemes, our scheme has the obvious advantages in all parameters, such as the public key, signature lengths and performance.
The new signature scheme requires one computation of square root in Z * q and one exponentiation in G to sign. For the verification, it requires two or three pairings and two exponentiations in G.
We note that the computation of the pairing is the most time-consuming in pairing based cryptosystems. Although there have been many papers discussing the complexity of pairings and how to speed up the pairing computation [2, 17, 19] , the computation of the pairing still remains time-consuming. Similar to BB04 scheme, some pairings in the proposed signature scheme can be precomputed and published as part of the signer's public key, such that there is only one pairing operation in the verification. We pre-compute a = e(u, g), b = e(v, g) and c = e(g, g), and publish them as part of the signer's public key. Then, for a message m ∈ Z * q , and a signature (σ, r), the verification can be done as follows:
e(σ, σ)
Hence, the verification requires only one pairing and two exponentiations in G T , and we note that the exponentiations in G T are significantly faster than pairing operations.
Signature Length. A signature in the new scheme contains of two elements (σ, r), where one element is in G and the other element is in Z * q . When using a supersingular elliptic curve over finite field F p n with embedding degree k = 6 and the modified Weil pairing or Tate pairing [9, 23] , the length of an element in Z * q and G can be approximately log 2 q bits, and therefore the total signature length is approximately 2 log 2 q bits. To be more precisely, let P ∈ E(F p n ), ord(P ) = q,
is the group of q-torsion points of E). Let φ be a distortion map, i.e., an efficiently computable automorphism of E[q] ∼ = Z q × Z q such that φ(P ) / ∈< P >= G. Actually, the map φ maps q -torsion points defined over F p n to q-torsion points defined over the extension field F p nk (For supersingular elliptic curve, such distortion map always exists). Consider the bilinear pairinĝ
here e w denotes the Weil pairing and µ q is the subgroup of order q in F * p nk . We can select the parameter such that the elements in G are 171-bits strings. A possible choice of these parameters can be from Boneh et al.'s short signature scheme [9] : G is derived from the curve E/GF (3 97 ) defined by y 2 = x 3 − x + 1, which has 923-bit discrete-log security. Therefore, at the current security requirement, we can obtain a signature whose length is approximately the same as a DSA signature with the same level of security, but which is provably secure and existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack without the random oracle model, which is the same as BB04. Hence, this is the second short signature scheme without random oracles.
However, the proposed signature scheme has a drawback, that is the scheme requires a symmetric bilinear map, whereas BLS and BB04 can work with a symmetric or an asymmetric map. Currently, the symmetric bilinear map with short representation of group element can only be found on supersingular curves. Since these curves have an embedding degree of at most 6, this will make the new signatures bigger and harder to scale, compared to BB04 and BLS, at higher security levels.
Proof of Security
The following theorem shows that the scheme above is existentially unforgeable in the strong sense under chosen message attacks, provided that the k + 1-SR assumption holds in (G, G T ).
Theorem 1. Suppose the (k + 1, t , )-SR assumption holds in (G, G T ).
Then the signature scheme above is (t, q S , )-secure against existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack provided that
where T is the maximum time for computing a square root in Z * q and an exponentiation in G.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we will prove the following: "If there exists a (t, q S , )-forger F using adaptive chosen message attack for the proposed signature scheme, then there exists a (t , )-algorithm A solving q S -SRP (also k + 1-SRP, if k + 1 > q S ), where t ≥ t + Θ(q S T ), = 2 − 2 q S q ." Assume F is a forger that (t, q S , )-breaks the signature scheme. We construct an algorithm A that, by interacting with F, solves the q S -SRP in time t with advantage .
Suppose A is given a challenge -a random instance of q S -SRP:
" For an integer q S , and x ∈ R Z q , g ∈ G, given
Next, we describe how the algorithm A to solve the q S -SRP by interacting with F. The approach is similar to BB04 [5] . We distinguish between two types of forgers that F can emulate. Let (G, G T , q, g, u, v) be the public key given to forger F where u = g x and v = g y . Suppose F asks for signatures on messages m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m q S ∈ Z * q and is given signatures (r i , σ i ) on these messages for i = 1, · · · , q S . Let h i = m i y + r i and let (m, r, σ) be the forgery produced by F.
Denote two types of forger F as:
Type-1 Forger which either makes query for m i = −x, or outputs a forgery where my + r / ∈ {h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h q S }.
Type-2 Forger which never makes any query for a message m = −x, and outputs a forgery where my + r ∈ {h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h q S }.
A plays the role of the signer, it produces a forgery for the signature scheme as follows:
A picks random y ∈ Z q and a bit b mode ∈ {1, 2} randomly. If b mode = 1, A publishes the public key
In F 's view, both P K 1 and P K 2 are valid public keys for the signature scheme.
Simulation: The forger F can issue up to q S signature queries in an adaptive fashion. To respond these signature queries, A maintains a list H-list of tuples (m i , r i , h i ) and a query counter l which is initially set to 0.
Upon receiving a signature query for m i , A increments l by one, and checks if l > q S . If l > q S , it neglects further queries by F and terminates F. Otherwise, it checks if g −mi = u. If so, then A just obtained the private key for the public key P K = (G, G T , q, g, u, v) it was given, which allows it to forge the signature on any message of its choice. At this point A successfully terminates the simulation.
Otherwise, if b mode = 1, set r i = h i − m i y ∈ Z q . In the very unlikely event that r i = 0, A reports failure and aborts. Otherwise, A gives F the signature (r i , σ i = s i ). This is a valid signature on m i under the public key P K 1 = (G, G T , q, g, u, v) since r i is uniform in Z q and
).
Reduction: Eventually, the forger F returns a forgery (m, r, σ), where (r, σ) is a valid forgery distinct from any previously given signature on message m. Note that by adding dummy queries as required, we may assume that F made exactly q S signature queries. Let W ← v m g r . Algorithm A searches the H-list for a tuple whose rightmost component is equal to W . Then according to two types of forger F , we denote the following events as: Denote E1 to be the event b mode = 1 (i.e., F produced a type-1 forgery, or F made a signature query for a message m i such that g −mi = u.) and denote E2 to be the event b mode = 2 . We claim that A can succeed in breaking the signature scheme if (E1 ∧ F 1) ∨ (E2 ∧ F 2) happens. Case 1. If u = g −mi , then A has already recovered the secret key of its challenger, A can forge a signature on any message of his choice. We assume that F produced a type-1 forgery (m, r, σ). Since the forgery is valid, we have e(σ, σ) = e(uv m g r , g) = e(ug my+r , g).
Let h = my + r. So, the forgery (m, r, σ) provides a new q S − SRP solution (h, σ).
Case 2. Since v = α = g x , then we know that there exists a pair v mj g rj = v m g r . Since (m, r) = (m j , r j ), otherwise it is not regarded as a forgery, so, m = m j , r = r j . Therefore, A can compute x = rj −r m−mj which also enables A to recover the secret key of its challenger. He can now forge a signature on any message of its choice.
Any valid forgery (m, r, σ) will give a new q S − SRP solution under at least one of the 2 above reductions.
This completes the description of Algorithm A. A standard argument shows that if A does not abort, then, from the viewpoint of F, the simulation provided by A is indistinguishable from a real attack scenario. Since the simulations are perfect, F cannot guess which reduction the simulator is using. Therefore, F produces a valid forgery in time t with probability at least .
Since E1 and F1 are independent with uniform distribution, P r[E1 ∨ E2] = 1 and P r[F 1 ∨ F 2] = 1, the probability that A succeeds is
Next we bound the probability that A dos not abort. From above description of A we know that A aborts if -At E1 ∧ F 1, only if r i = 0, i.e., m i y = h i . For given y, this happens with probability at most q S q . -or at E2 ∧ F 2, only if r i = 0, i.e., m i h i = y. For given y, this happens with probability at most q S q . So, A succeeds with probability at least 2 − 2 q S q . Let T be the maximum time for a computing square root in Z * q and an exponentiation in G. The running time of A is t ≥ t + Θ(q S T ). This complete the proof.
Verification: Given a public key (G, G T , e, q, g, u, H), a message m, and a signature σ, verify that
This signature scheme can provide the same signature length as BLS scheme. We compare this signature scheme with the BLS scheme from the view point of computation overhead. The key and signature generation times are comparable to BLS signatures. The verification time is faster, since the verification requires only one pairing and one exponentiation due to the pre-computation of a = e(u, g) and c = e(g, g). This is comparable to the random-oracle version of the BB signature, which also uses a single pairing. By contrast, the BLS signature requires two pairings.
About the security of proposed signature scheme against an adaptive chosen message attack, we obtain the following theorem: Theorem 2. If there exists a (t, q H , q S , )-forger F using adaptive chosen message attack for the proposed signature scheme, then there exists a (t , )-algorithm A solving q H − k-SRP (for a constant k ∈ Z + ), where
Especially, there exists a (t = t, ≥
Proof. In the proposed signature scheme, before signing a message m, we need to make a query H(m). Our proof is in the random oracle model (the hash function is seen as a random oracle, i.e., the output of the hash function is uniformly distributed). Suppose that a forger F (t, q H , q S , )-break the signature scheme using an adaptive chosen message attack. We will use F to construct an algorithm A to solve q H − 1-SRP.
Suppose A is given a challenge: " For integer q H and k, and x ∈ R Z q , g ∈ G, given
Now A plays the role of the signer and sets the public key be u = α. A will answer hash oracle queries and signing queries itself. We assume that F never repeats a hash query or a signature query. S1 A prepares q H responses {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w q H } of the hash oracle queries, h 1 , . . . , h q H −k are distributed randomly in this response set.
S2 F makes a hash oracle query on m j for 1 ≤ j ≤ q H . A sends w j to F as the response of the hash oracle query on m j .
S3 F makes a signature oracle query for w j . If w i = h j , A returns g (x+hj ) 1 2 to F as the response. Otherwise, A reports failure and aborts. S4 Eventually, F halts and outputs a message-signature pair (m, σ). Here the hash value of m is some w l and w l / ∈ {h 1 , . . . , h q H −k }. Since (m, σ) is a valid forgery and H(m) = w l , it satisfies: e(σ, σ) = e(g H(m) u, g).
So, σ = g Algorithm A simulates the random oracles and signature oracle perfectly for F. F cannot distinguish between A 's simulation and real life because the hash function behaves as a random oracle. Therefore F produces a valid forgery for the signature scheme with probability at least . Now, we bound the probability A dos not abort. In step S3, the success probability of A is q H −k q H , and hence, for all signature oracle queries, A will not fail with probability
(if F only makes s(≤ q S ) signature oracle queries, the success probability of A is s−1 j=0 q H −k−j q H −j ). Hence, after the algorithm A finished the step S4, the success probability of A is:
In particular, if we let k = 1, then the success probability of A is:
The running time of A is equal to the running time of F, where t = t.
Conclusion and Further Works
In this paper, we proposed the second short signature scheme from bilinear pairing which is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack without using random oracles. The security of our scheme depends on a new complexity assumption called the k+1 square roots assumption. Furthermore, the k+1 square roots assumption gives even shorter signatures in the random oracle model, where a signature is only one element in a bilinear group. As for applications of our signature schemes, we present a new chameleon hash signature scheme, an on-line/off-line signature scheme and a new efficient anonymous credential scheme based on the proposed signature scheme in the earlier version of this paper [27] . These applications are omitted here due to the page limitation. BLS [9] , BB04 [5] and ZSS [28] short signature schemes play an important role in many pairing-based cryptographic systems. The proposed signature scheme is comparable to them and we expect to see many other schemes based on it, such as group signatures [6] , aggregate signatures [8] and others.
